Page 62 - Anatomy-of-a-Fraud
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                     challenged, who will be barred from seeking a legislative seat…” .   And Carlos F.
                     Rodríguez, second vice presidential candidate on the ADO ticket, had this to say on the
                     challenge in question: “it is unfair; it results from considerations that have nothing to
                     do with the law and poses serious questions as to the Tribunals’ impartiality during the
                                           22
                     forthcoming  elections” .  (See  exhibit  16).  It  is  worth  noticing  that  the  UNADE
                     candidate in Antón, i.e., the man who stood to benefit the most from Arias Guardia’s
                     challenged nomination, was Barletta’s brother-in-law. But despite all the “help” he
                     received (reminiscent of the “help” given Torrijos’s cousin in 1978), he still lost. The
                     people of Antón voted for Arias Guardia’s first alternate, Emiliano Ponce, who was
                     elected by a wide margin.

                             Before moving on to the next chapter, which describes the elections and the
                     counting of the votes, it is appropriate to summarize the points covered thus far.

                             The 1984 electoral process in Panama exhibited four major traits:


                                 1.  The manifest and unlawful interference by the Defense

                                 Forces General Staff with the selection of the pro-government
                                 candidate and the electoral campaign.

                                 2.  The  wide  and  documented  misuse  of  government
                                 resources,  both  human  and  material,  in  favor  of  the  pro-
                                 government candidate.
                                 3.   The unscrupulous manipulation and the effective control

                                 of the media.

                                 4.   The lack of impartiality of the Electoral Tribunal, which
                                 the presiding judge could not effectively control.






                             But all of this would not be enough to ensure the victory of Barletta. It had
                     been 16 long years of dictatorship and the people were not about to forget it. It would
                     be necessary to alter voter registration lists, engage in massive vote-buying, arbitrary
                     challenges,  the  stealing  of  tally  sheets  and  the  forging  of  signatures  and,  finally,
                     physical  violence  and  murder.  Then  and  only  then  would  they  be  able  to  claim
                     victory… a Pyrrhic victory indeed.






                     21  La Prensa, April 27, 1984, page 1A.
                     22  Ibid.
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